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infections. The isolates were susceptible to most non-
β-lactam drugs, had pulsed-field gel electrophoresis
(PFGE) profiles that differed from typical healthcare-asso-
ciated MRSA, and contained the Panton-Valentine leuko-
cidin toxin. Prospective surveillance for MRSA in
Minnesota at 12 sentinel hospitals (6 in metropolitan areas
and 6 in rural areas) indicated that community-associated
MRSA patients were significantly younger than health-
care-associated MRSA patients and more likely to have
skin and soft tissue infections than respiratory or urinary
tract infections. A study in Texas showed that incision and
drainage of abscesses due to community-associated
MRSA was more effective management than administer-
ing antimicrobial agents alone, particularly since many
patients were given ineffective antimicrobial agents (i.e.,
β-lactam agents). 
Molecular analysis of the community-associated
MRSA strains showed that the methicillin resistance gene
mecA is typically carried on a much smaller genetic ele-
ment than is seen in healthcare-associated MRSA. Four
distinct elements, called staphylococcal chromosome cas-
sette mec (or SCCmec), have been described. In the United
States, SCCmec type II, which is approximately 60 kb in
size and also carries an erythromycin resistance determi-
nant, predominates among healthcare-associated MRSA,
while SCCmec type IV, which is only  23 kb in length and
carries no other resistance determinants, is typically asso-
ciated with community-associated MRSA. Three major
strain typing methods, PFGE, multi-locus sequence typing
(MLST), and staphylococcal protein Atyping (spa typing),
are used to study the spread of MRSA. MLST identified a
series of five major lineages (also called clonal complex-
es) of MRSA globally, while spa typing and PFGE subdi-
vide this group into approximately a dozen epidemic
clones. Virulence determinates for MRSA include a series
of enterotoxins, toxic shock toxin, and the Panton-
Valentine leukocidin toxin. 
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A range of quarantine approaches were used in five
jurisdictions heavily affected by the outbreak of severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003.
Implementation of modern quarantine was resource inten-
sive, involved coordination of multiple sectors of society,
frequently required new legislative actions or authorities,
and was highly dependent on effective communication.
In Toronto, Ontario, Canada, quarantine ranged from
home quarantine with active surveillance to enhanced pas-
sive surveillance augmented by education about preven-
tion and a contact number to call if symptoms developed.
Healthcare workers were occasionally required to adhere
to “work quarantine.” New legislation in Ontario author-
ized compulsory quarantine with active follow-up for
compliance. Although 30,000 people in Toronto were rec-
ommended for quarantine, enforcement orders had to be
issued in only 27 instances. A comprehensive infrastruc-
ture was developed to support those in quarantine; masks,
thermometers, food, and financial assistance, as well as
psychosocial support, were provided. Should SARS return
to Toronto, the same measures would be used to ensure
that close contacts of infected persons are isolated and
actively monitored. 
In Taiwan, from April 28 to July 4, 2003, travelers
arriving from World Health Organization–designated
SARS-affected areas were quarantined for 10 days (level B
quarantine). During the SARS epidemic, 50,319 persons
who were close contacts of SARS patients were placed
under level Aquarantine; suspected or probable SARS was
diagnosed for 112 (0.22%). Atotal of 80,813 persons were
placed under level B quarantine; 21 (0.03%) of these cases
were diagnosed as suspected or probable SARS. The
strategies were later modified as understanding of the
infectivity of SARS increased, so that close contacts and
travelers from local transmission areas were required to
follow guidelines of self health management, including
isolation at home only when they had a fever. Fever mon-
itoring at international ports initially continued year-round;
its ongoing utility will be further examined. 
Singapore relied on effective quarantine of all persons
who had unprotected close contact with symptomatic case-
patients. Critical systems were implemented for quarantine
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An archive CD-ROM including synchronized presentations,
PDFs, and audio recordings of sessions is available for pur-
chase from Conference Archives, 239 Main Street, Suite 300,
Johnstown, Pennsylvania 15901; telephone: 866-316-3289
or at http://www.conferencearchives.com/cgi-bin/caistore/
CDR040308.htmpolicy and practice, legislative backing, communications,
enforcement and surveillance, safeguards on public trans-
port and hospital visits, financial support, operational
costs, and compensation. As the gravity of the situation
became clear, the Infectious Diseases Act was invoked to
impose quarantine on exposed, potentially infectious per-
sons. A Quarantine Board was set up to assist with deci-
sions on a case-by-case basis. An important lesson was the
value of clear communication. As part of a comprehensive
financial and social support system, the government
offered an allowance to self-employed persons to compen-
sate for part of their lost income and to establishments with
affected employees. 
In Hong Kong, medical services were severely disrupt-
ed when 380 healthcare workers became ill with SARS.
From April to June 2003, the economy lost an estimated
U.S.$3 billion, gross domestic product growth fell by
3.7%, and exports slumped by 13.9%. SARS was con-
trolled by a combination of measures, including disease
surveillance, isolation of cases, heightened infection con-
trol, contact tracing, quarantine, entry and exit screening,
and community engagement. Hospital isolation facilities
and infection control training were strengthened by adding
1,000 extra isolation beds and a U.S. $20 million training
fund. Retrospective analysis showed that SARS developed
in 2.7% of household contacts in home quarantine, and
approximately 90% of all case-patients had an identifiable
epidemiologic link. Entry and exit screenings that use
health declarations and temperature checks, which detect-
ed only two cases during the outbreak, have covered 90
million passengers, 5,000 of whom had fever. Addressing
surge capacity was a key issue, in which the private med-
ical sector and nongovernmental organizations proved piv-
otal in providing medical services, community education,
and support for emergency operations, including quaran-
tine both at home and at dedicated residential facilities.
Beijing, China, experienced the world's largest out-
break of SARS in spring 2003 with 2,521 reported proba-
ble cases. Quarantine played an important role in
controlling the outbreak. By July 1, a total of 30,178 per-
sons, 0.21% of the Beijing population, had been quaran-
tined. Most close contacts were quarantined at home
(60%); the rest were at designated sites, including hotels,
universities, and construction worksites. In late April,
fever checks were instituted at the airport, major train sta-
tions, and all 71 roads connecting Beijing to other areas;
these sites used infrared thermometers to screen and axil-
lary thermometers to confirm fever among passengers. As
of June 30, 2003, of almost 14 million people screened,
only 12 probable cases of SARS were identified. All
healthcare workers in SARS-designated hospitals had to
stay in designated hotels close to the hospitals rather than
at home. After finishing their work with SARS patients,
they were sent to resort areas for 2 more weeks. Top chal-
lenges for implementing quarantine included tracing con-
tacts, maintaining movement restrictions even at home,
and finding the resources to provide 10,000 people with
supplies and psychological care. Nonetheless, the same
quarantine measures will be implemented if SARS returns. 
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